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Abstract: 
I here defend historical entitlement theories of property rights against a popular charge. This is the objection 
that such theories fail because no convincing account of original appropriation exists. I argue that this argument 
assumes a certain reading of historical entitlement theory and I spell out an alternative reading against which it 
misfires. On this reading, the role of acts of original appropriation is not to justify but to individuate people‟s 
holdings. I argue that we can identify which acts count as original appropriation against the background of a 
general justification for a practice of property rights. On this view, what I will call „natural‟ acts of original 
appropriation are acts by which a person begins to satisfy the general conditions for justified ownership. Finally, 
I offer an interpretation of John Locke's theory of appropriation along these lines and argue that it provides an 
attractive reading of his view. 
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Article: 
In this article, I defend historical entitlement theories of property rights against a popular charge. This is the 
charge that such theories fail because there cannot be acts that bring about the appropriation of unowned objects 
by persons. This objection seems to deliver a decisive blow to historical entitlement theories of property rights, 
which hold that the legitimacy of people‟s holdings depends on their pedigree. On a historical entitlement view, 
establishing that an individual has a property right over a certain thing requires showing that she obtained her 
possessions in a legitimate manner.
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Now most of the time this will happen by means of a legitimate transfer by someone else who already had a 
valid property right over that thing. But that can only be part of the story. For how did that previous person 
obtain her property right? In other words, we still need an answer to how such chains of (legitimate) transfers 
can get started at all. It is at this point, usually, that an account of original appropriation is invoked. An act of 
legitimate original appropriation is one whereby individuals can acquire property rights in previously unowned 
objects through unilaterally undertaking particular acts.
2
 
 
On the standard reading of historical entitlement theories of property rights, the idea of original appropriation is 
said to deliver two things. First, it offers an account of why property rights (of some specific kind) are morally 
justified. Here the answer is that an act of original appropriation has been performed that justifies the right. 
Second, it offers the means of establishing the legitimacy of the given particular holdings of people at a given 
time. Here we must look for persons who have performed acts of original appropriation and to whom they have 
transferred their acquired rights. Thus the idea of original appropriation seems crucial to the viability of a 
historical entitlement theory of property.
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But many philosophers now think that the idea that there can be acts by which persons can generate property 
rights for themselves makes no sense. That is, most now believe that the idea that there are natural acts of 
original appropriation should be rejected. Moreover, this dire state of the idea of acts of original appropriation is 
thought to shed serious doubt on historical entitlement theories of property rights. In his famous book on the 
right to private property, Jeremy Waldron puts the objection forcefully: 
 
entitlements to keep what [original appropriators] have seized were based on the assumption that the 
mechanisms for a fairer distribution were not available. When that assumption failed, when those 
mechanisms did become available, then the entitlements founded on the assumption of their absence 
could not prevail. They were revealed then as provisional entitlements not as the enduring foundations 
of a system of justice that could continue to constrain us today in our thinking and action on the matter.
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Waldron‟s words reflect what is now the mainstream position. That is, most now believe that what people justly 
own is not determined by the way in which they came to hold their possessions, but must be determined by 
means of a more straightforwardly distributive theory of property rights. This is thought to be a consequence of 
the failure of theories of acts of original appropriation. Since there can be no such acts, the argument goes, there 
can be no historical entitlement theory of property rights.
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In this article, I will challenge this conclusion. I will begin (Section 1) by accepting the force of the standard 
criticisms of acts of original appropriation. However, I will argue (Section 2) that these criticisms only apply to 
the standard reading of historical entitlement theories I described above (in which acts of original appropriation 
are seen as both the justification of property rights and the means for establishing who owns what). Instead, I 
will argue for a different reading of such theories, a reading in which acts of original appropriation are seen as 
part of a wider theory of property rights. Against this view the criticisms of acts of original appropriation fail to 
strike and thus do not show that historical entitlement theory must be rejected. I will claim that on this reading 
the historical entitlement theorist can hold on to all the elements of the theory, including the acts we usually 
think of as acts of original appropriation. I will argue for this in Section 3, where I set out an account of what I 
will label „natural‟ acts of original appropriation. Thus I will not here defend the historical entitlement theory of 
property rights as such, but instead show that a popular reason for rejecting the theory, based on doubts about 
available accounts of original appropriation, is wrong. However, I will attempt in the final section to add to the 
plausibility of this view by showing how the arguments of the most notable original appropriation theorist, 
Locke, can be made to fit the approach I am putting forward. 
 
This is clearly an important task. A main and intuitively attractive line of thinking in political philosophy is 
discredited by the attack on original acquisition. Indeed, the idea that there can be acts of original appropriation 
is caught in a remarkable limbo. Almost everyone believes that it must be possible for people to appropriate 
things that are unowned. In addition, it does seem very plausible to say that we have property rights over 
something we obtain via a legitimate transfer if the previous owner of that thing had an untainted property right 
over it herself.
6
 Yet at the same time, consensus among philosophers now has it that there can be no such acts. 
But without an account of original appropriation, any theorist of property rights has a serious problem. Original 
appropriation is not just something from a fanciful past. Unowned things are appropriated all of the time. 
Moreover, there may (will) even arise entirely new questions of original appropriation, perhaps in Antarctica, 
on the moon, or on Mars, and perhaps in the form of new kinds of property. So we had better be prepared. As 
Nozick rightly pointed out: „it is not only persons favoring private property who need a theory of how property 
rights legitimately originate‟.
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1. The attack on original appropriation 
We have seen that on the standard reading the viability of historical entitlement theories depends on the 
possibility of acts of original appropriation bringing about property rights. But it is not difficult to see why 
many think the task of showing that there can be such acts of original appropriation is a hard one. When a 
person establishes a property right over something that is unowned, she thereby affects the moral situation of 
others. By appropriating an object, a person gains some rights regarding the object and this means that all others 
have lost some liberty regarding the object by gaining duties towards the new owner. What is more, if original 
appropriation is possible, it seems that these changes can come about by someone unilaterally performing a 
certain act. When I appropriate an unowned apple, say by picking it from a tree, you lose the right to take that 
apple by gaining a duty to not take it away from me. And all this because of my picking it. 
 
The major candidate in the history of philosophy for a theory of original appropriation is, of course, John 
Locke‟s idea that a person‟s mixing labour with an unowned object can ground her having a property right over 
it. Locke held that persons own their own bodies; they are what may (anachronistically) be called „self-owners‟. 
But such self-owners do not only own their bodies, they stand in a similar relation to such things as the efforts 
and movements their bodies might generate. Thus, on one reading of this view, if a self-owner labours on an 
unowned object, she extends to that object something that she owns. She mixes something she owns with 
something that is unowned. This is what makes it the case that the act of labouring on an object can ground a 
person‟s property right in an object. As Locke famously put it: 
 
Though the Earth and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men, yet every Man has a Property in his 
own Person. This no Body has any right to but himself. The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his 
Hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature hath 
provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it something that is his own, and 
thereby makes it his Property. It being by him removed from the common state Nature placed it in, hath 
by this Labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other Men. For this Labour 
being the unquestionable Property of the Labourer, no Man but he can have a right to what that is once 
joyned to, at least where there is enough, and as good left for others.
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An action that connects something one owns to an unowned object will, on this view, give one a property right 
to it. Labour is a prime example of such an action. Labouring on an unowned object is to extend one‟s 
previously owned energy to that object and thus to draw it within the range of things one owns.
9
 
 
Locke‟s proposal is not the only version of a theory of original appropriation. Another familiar one is the idea of 
first occupancy. On this view, to be the first who takes (in some relevant sense) an unowned object is, quite 
simply, to become its owner. We know of this kind of appropriation from daily life. If I drive up to the parking 
spot before you do, I get to park my car there. If you have taken the final seat on the bus, I have to stand for the 
journey. In both of these cases, it is possible to take possession of something merely by being the first to occupy 
a certain spot. Perhaps it may be said that such rights (rights of usufruct) only resemble true property rights. For 
when I drive away, the parking spot is no longer mine and the same goes for your seat on the bus. In any case, 
the parking spot and seat were presumably not unowned in the sense intended here. But it may be possible that 
the same idea can apply to genuinely unowned objects. Take land for example. Here is this vast, uninhabited 
piece of land. Perhaps I can gain possession over some piece of it by being the first who decides to live there?
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However, such accounts are notoriously underdetermined. On Locke‟s view, it is unclear for many objects how 
to distinguish between what one becomes entitled to through labour mixing and the rest which is to remain as it 
was. Consider again land. If I cultivate some strips of land, do I gain only those strips or also the land in 
between? What about the road I use to move from one to the other? Say I cultivate one of my strips by planting 
some apple trees. Presumably, I own the apple trees. Perhaps I also own the land on which they stand.
11
 But if I 
cut them down to use as wood for a fire, do I still own the land? Nozick has rightly argued that claiming that 
labour constitutes the mixing of what one owns with something one does not own can only be part of an 
argument for appropriation. What needs to be added is a reason for the conclusion that one actually gains the 
object, instead of losing one‟s labour. As Nozick illustrates, if I pour a can of tomato juice in the sea, do I gain 
the sea or lose my juice?
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Similar objections can be made against the idea that first occupancy is an appropriating act. It is not always the 
case that the first person who enters an unowned piece of land thereby comes to own it. And there seem to be 
limits to what one can appropriate by means of occupancy which cannot be explained in terms of the argument 
that occupancy constitutes appropriation. Surely no one believes that if I somehow succeed in putting a fence 
around the entire piece of uninhabited land, I thereby gain a property right over all that land.
13
 
These are problems with specifying the conditions under which doing something constitutes appropriation 
(instead of, say, waste) and with fixing what is thereby appropriated. There are also more fundamental problems 
with the idea that there can be acts of original appropriation. Many have objected to the very idea of unilateral 
appropriation. They are suspicious of the possibility that people can be made subject to duties to others by the 
others‟ unilateral actions. This suspicion goes back at least to the time of the natural law theorists. Samuel 
Pufendorf, for example, objected that „we can not apprehend how a bare corporal Act, such as seizure is, should 
be able to prejudice the Right and Powers of others, unless their consent be added to confirm it; that is, unless a 
covenant intervene‟.
14
 More recently, Jeremy Waldron has referred to arguments that try to establish the pos-
sibility of unilateral original appropriation as radically unfamiliar, uneasy, and seemingly repugnant. 
15 
 
Additionally, the idea that there are such special acts of original appropriation commits us to some rather 
implausible conclusions. To say that there are acts of appropriation is to say that there are acts such that 
performing them creates a property right for the agent ex nihilo. Crucially, a natural act of original appropriation 
is said to bring this about by virtue of the act‟s description qua act. That is, on the standard reading of theories 
of original appropriation, there are said to be acts that intrinsically bring about property rights, acts that are 
somehow special in that they lead to the agent gaining a property right. But this idea sounds mysterious. For if 
there is something special about these acts that makes them natural acts of appropriation, then why can the same 
act, only performed later, not have the same effect? If there is something about the act qua act that makes it be 
an act of appropriation, then why should we not be able to appropriate (or co-appropriate) already owned 
things? What makes the idea of a natural act of appropriation mysterious is that its significance must be such 
that it creates a right excluding the possibility of similar later acts. 
16 
 
This, then, is the attack on the idea of original appropriation. The idea that there are acts that simply create 
property rights, acts in whose nature it lies that they bring about property rights, seems mysterious. For it seems 
doubtful that there can be acts that could carry the justificatory burden for allowing some to exclude others from 
using, taking, changing, and consuming previously unowned things. 
 
2. The role of original appropriation 
These are very powerful criticisms and it may thus seem that we should conclude that there can be no such thing 
as a unilateral act of original appropriation. But appearances deceive. For the attack on original appropriation 
assumes one crucial thing, namely that it is really the idea of acts of original appropriation that must fulfil the 
two tasks I mentioned at the beginning of this article: (1) providing an account of why property rights (of some 
kind) are morally justified and (2) providing the means of establishing the legitimacy of the given particular 
holdings of people at a given time. Let us call these (1) the element of justification and (2) the element of 
individuation. 
 
It is clear that any theory of property rights should, in one way or another, deal with both of these tasks. No 
theory of property rights would be worthy of its name if it did not tell us that such rights are justified and no 
theory of property rights would be worthy of its name if it did not allow us to establish whether Jim really has a 
property right over his car, whether Jane really owns her house, and so forth. Only with both of these parts will 
a theory of property rights perform its function of enabling us to establish whether the actual holdings of actual 
persons are legitimate. 
 
Now the criticisms of acts of appropriation discussed above have it that no act can achieve both of these things. 
But why should we expect acts of original appropriation to do this in the first place? Why should we think that 
there is something about acts of appropriation qua acts that both tells us who came to own something that was 
not already owned (individuation) and, at the same time, justifies the property right so established 
(justification)? Alternatively, we should see acts of original appropriation as part of a wider theory of property 
rights, and it is this wider theory that contains the justificatory element. With this in place, the role of acts of 
original appropriation is to supplement that general justification for property rights with the means to identify 
what are people‟s legitimate holdings.
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To see this more clearly, let us consider both elements in turn, starting with the element of justification. We saw 
that the concern about appropriation stems from the fact that appropriation allows for the freedom of individuals 
to be quite straightforwardly limited: acts of original appropriation bestow duties on others. The generation of 
such duties clearly calls for justification. How can it be that some are subject to duties due to others possessing 
certain objects? This is the crucial justificatory issue for a theory of property rights. 
 
But this justificatory problem is not merely a problem about the possibility of original appropriation as such. It 
is a problem about the existence of the institution of property as a whole. The liberty lost as a result of an act of 
appropriation is a liberty one lacks with regards to all existing property rights, whether they are the result of 
original appropriation or not. If the one is worrisome, then surely the others must be worrisome too. The 
justificatory problem therefore is the general one of people having property rights, not just the possibility of 
appropriation. It is the existence of the exclusionary right that stands so blatantly in need of justification, not the 
mere fact that people should be able to bring them into existence. If we can offer a good justification for the 
former, the problem posed by the possibility of the latter seems decidedly smaller. 
18 
 
What we need, then, is a justification for the rights that go with the original appropriation and subsequent 
possession of property by persons. That is, we need a justification for the presence in a society of an ongoing 
practice involving rights that enable people to exclude others from access to, use of, and the possibility of 
unilaterally appropriating their possessions. We are familiar with some good candidates for this kind of general 
justification. Most proposals refer in one way or another to the effects of having the institution of property 
present in a society. Such effects may be beneficial through ensuring that people enjoy the fruits of their 
labour
19
 or through leading to higher social welfare by aligning individual preferences with entrepreneurial 
activities and productive use of resources.
20
 Other proposals could work as well, of course. The correct general 
justification could, for example, refer to the idea that people somehow identify deeply with the objects they 
have in their possession.
21 
 
Indeed, most existing plausible proposals (that I know) about what may justify property rights in fact include 
some such justification of property rights as a practice. Even Locke and Nozick, usually portrayed as 
champions of the act of appropriation, offer us considerations of this kind. Locke‟s theory of property rights 
works against the background of God‟s command to make use of what he has given us so that mankind may „Be 
Fruitful, and Multiply, and Replenish the Earth.‟
22
 The implication of this duty is that appropriation must 
somehow be justifiable: it is in accordance with God‟s will. (We will return to this in Section 4.) In addition, 
Nozick writes that private property  
 
increases the social product by putting means of production in the hands of those who can use them most 
efficiently (profitably); experimentation is encouraged ... private property enables people to decide on 
the pattern and types of risks they wish to bear, leading to specialized types of risk bearing; private 
property protects future persons by leading some to hold back resources from current consumption for 
future markets; [and my personal favourite] it provides alternate sources of employment for unpopular 
persons who don‟t have to convince any one person or small group to hire them, and so on.
23 
 
So what, then, is the role of acts of original appropriation? Assume for a moment that a general justification for 
the existence of property rights can be had, that a practice of property rights can be justified. What kind of work 
do we want our account of appropriation to do? What is appropriation for? First, it is clear that against the 
background of such a general justification of property rights it is no longer true that acts of appropriation have 
to do any moral work. For now saying that it is possible for individuals to appropriate unilaterally unowned 
things is not the same as saying that it is the performance of an act of original appropriation that justifies 
property rights. 
 
Instead, acts of original appropriation are required for a particular practice of (justified) property rights to get 
started at a specific moment in time. The reason for this is that justifications of property at the general level can 
only establish a general conclusion: that there is a justification for situations in which people have property 
rights. They tell us that there is no moral problem when certain individuals claim certain rights against others 
with respect to certain objects. But this leaves out an important thing. For a general justification does not tell us 
whether the holdings of any given set of persons are in fact justified, nor how we could know. If we want to 
establish that, we need to know how a particular individual, call her P, can come to own a particular object, 
name it O. In particular, we want to know how P can come to possess O when it is not already in someone 
else‟s possession. 
 
The account of original appropriation thus serves the function of individuating property rights; it allows 
previously unowned objects to become covered by the (justified) property rights of particular individuals. 
Without it, we would lack an intuitively appealing means of identifying whether a given set of holdings that 
arose from a situation in which there were no property rights present constitutes legitimate property. Without it, 
we would lack the means of establishing the legitimacy of something that was not yet owned coming into 
someone‟s possession. This is the role of original appropriation. It involves specifying certain acts that signify 
that a person can legitimately claim to have a property right. It involves specifying what counts as original 
appropriation.
24 
 
3. What counts as original appropriation? 
We have seen that the justificatory part of a theory of property rights tells us what it is about property rights that 
makes a practice involving such exclusionary rights justified. We have seen also that it is against the 
background of such a general theory perfectly possible to say that the performance of some act under certain 
circumstances is a sufficient condition for a person to own a previously unowned object. In other words, it is 
perfectly possible for there to be unilateral acts that bring about the original appropriation of an object by a 
person.
25 
 
So what acts can count as original appropriation? In principle, the role could be fulfilled by any type of act 
consistent with the wider theory of property rights. Thus, if the correct theory of property rights were consistent 
with acts of labouring on unowned objects counting as original appropriation, then that might do the trick. 
Indeed, if the correct theory of property were consistent with there being a known convention that when a 
person did a little dance around an object, she came to own it, that too could count as an act of original 
appropriation. 
 
Does this mean that what counts as original appropriation is an entirely open question? Is it mere convention 
that determines what acts are to have such effects? Such a result would seem to rid the theory of historical 
entitlement of much of its traditional content, for proposals of such a view have virtually always included 
proposals of specific acts as acts of original appropriation. Moreover, if acts of appropriation could only be 
determined by convention, the historical entitlement theorist would be facing a serious problem. Conventions 
normally arise through the relevant acts being actually carried out. But then what about a situation in which 
there are no property rights yet? If there have been no acts of appropriation yet, there will probably be no 
convention about what counts as such either. How can there be legitimate original appropriation if there is no 
act that counts as such?
26
 The historical entitlement theorist must therefore be able to say something about what 
counts as original appropriation independent of conventions. 
 
Fortunately, the account of original appropriation can be filled out further in light of the general justification 
offered. The first thing to note is that there clearly will be better and worse candidates for such acts. For 
example, as it seems plausible to say that much of the value of property rights comes from the stable expec-
tations and opportunities for mutually beneficial trade they foster, we should look for acts of original 
appropriation that will make others aware of the newly established right. Acts of original appropriation, that is, 
should clearly communicate to others that a certain object has come into the possession of a particular person. 
27 
 
But there is more that can be said. Although there is no necessary limit to what acts may count as original 
appropriation, we can also understand what may be „natural‟ acts of original appropriation. An act is a „natural‟ 
act of original appropriation when it can be viewed as an extension of the wider theory of property rights .
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General justifications of property rights, like the ones just discussed, spell out a rationale justifying the practice 
of property rights. By giving us the general conditions for justified ownership, the justification refers to a 
particular effect or activity the existence of such rights is to foster. Consider again, for example, a theory that 
holds that a certain property regime is justified because it leads to a society‟s social product multiplying. If that 
is what justifies property, then the rationale for justified holdings will be something like the following: 
according such rights to people disposes them to use resources productively. Alternatively, on another theory of 
property rights the rationale for justified holdings may be that property rights help people secure the possessions 
to which they feel connected. 
 
We can begin by spelling out the rationale of a theory by asking what property rights are for. For example, a 
theory could tell us that if property rights of some kind lead to widely shared economic benefits, then such 
property rights are justified or that if property rights of some kind tend to offer people control over the objects 
they care about the most, then such rights are justified. In this way, a theory‟s rationale spells out general 
conditions for justified ownership. And so, if property rights are justified because they lead to the social product 
multiplying, the general conditions of justified ownership can be stated as something like this: if it leads to 
objects being put to certain sorts of use, their ownership can be justified. 
 
A „natural‟ act of appropriation is an act that is an extension of the rationale of the wider theory of justified 
property rights. It will be the kind of act by which one begins to satisfy the general conditions for justified 
ownership. On the example just given of a justification referring to the beneficial consequences for the social 
product due to increased productivity, a „natural‟ way for persons to appropriate things will be their productive 
use of resources. By putting things to productive use, people will be doing to objects exactly what is required 
for their property rights to be justified. They are acting in accordance with the theory‟s rationale and their 
behaviour satisfies the general conditions for justified ownership. Hence such acts can be said to constitute 
„natural‟ acts of original appropriation. In the next section, I will argue that Locke‟s theory offers us a good 
example of precisely this view. 
 
Note, however, that this is not to say, on the example we are considering, that when people do not put the things 
they own to productive use, they must thereby cease to have a property right over such things. Nor is it to say 
that anyone who would ever make productive use of something must thereby come to possess it. The general 
theory of property rights may specify that property rights should protect the possession of objects even when 
their owners do not use them in accordance with the theory‟s rationale, for example because, as seems plausible, 
rights offering that kind of protection would actually foster more productive behaviour overall. Similarly, our 
theory may postulate more conditions for acts to bring about a property right, such as, again, that the act was 
clear and overt, but also that it was carried out under certain circumstances. 
 
By contrast, the present point is one about how a theory of property rights can offer determinate content as to 
what acts count as original appropriation, and this comes in the form of acts that are in accordance with the 
theory‟s rationale. Note, however, that we cannot say what kind of act in fact counts as original appropriation 
before we know what the correct general justification of property rights is. For the nature of acts of original 
appropriation depends on the general justification contained in the wider theory of property rights; it is part of 
the account of individuation provided by that theory. 
 
4. A Lockean theory of property 
This argument has the consequence that none of the traditional candidates for acts of original appropriation can 
be ruled out from the outset. In other words, despite the traditional criticisms of acts of original appropriation, it 
is perfectly possible to hold a historical entitlement theory of property rights that specifies certain acts as 
capable of creating property rights for individuals over unowned objects under certain conditions. I will now try 
to illustrate this further by offering a possible interpretation of Locke‟s theory of property rights along these 
lines. This interpretation lends, I think, additional support to the argument above as it allows us to construct a 
picture of Locke‟s thought that avoids the standard criticisms noted above, lets some passages that are 
traditionally thought problematic fit in his overall theory more easily, and makes for, I think, a rather plausible 
view overall. 
 
As pointed out above, Locke thought that the preservation of mankind is a fundamental duty of the law of 
nature, consistent with the will of God. In this light, he gave us a number of considerations that can be seen as 
forming a general justification of the practice of having property rights. These considerations stress the 
beneficial effects of the possibility of property rights in terms of how much there is for persons to own. Thus 
Locke writes that „he who appropriates land to himself by his labour, does not lessen but increase the common 
stock of mankind‟ .
29
 Locke also speculated about the (enormous) increases in resources brought about by 
productive labour facilitated by the existence of property rights. Throughout sections 40–3 of the Second 
Treatise he is at pains to make this plain by comparing various examples from his England to (some sort of) 
accounts of areas in the world where private property was not in place. 
 
The implications of this for Locke‟s theory of appropriation will be clear by now. If such is the kind of general 
justification of property rights to which Locke adheres, then his account that acts of labouring on unowned 
objects count as original appropriation can be seen as the natural extension of the more general view. For 
Locke, it is labour which leads to the huge increases in stock in society (Locke repeatedly mentions figures 
ranging from 90 percent to 99 percent of its value being due to labour) and thus it is only natural to say that an 
act of labour can bring about a property right over an unowned object. To labour on an unowned object is to do 
with it what, in view of the general justification, we think is desirable (that is, employ it productively). Given 
that it is desirable for objects to be employed productively
30
 and that it is precisely the point of property rights 
that they accord protection for such use, an act of labour on an unowned object is the „natural‟ act of original 
appropriation. 
31 
 
This interpretation of Locke‟s views allows us to see his theory as a natural whole. For example, it makes 
Locke‟s claim that there are provisos that specify the conditions under which acts of labouring can bring about 
property rights an integral part of his theory – instead of an oddity that needs to be explained. First, Locke‟s 
proviso that appropriation only goes through if one leaves „enough, and as good‟ for others clearly ties in with 
the general justification of property. It is precisely the point of property rights that they lead to an increase in 
goods. But if one‟s appropriation were to lead to a situation wherein others were so badly off that they no longer 
had enough and as good as they would have in a state of nature, the practice of property rights would defeat its 
essential purpose: to make people better off.
32 
 
We can give a similar interpretation of the so-called Spoliation Proviso, an element that is often said to sit 
uneasily within Locke‟s wider theory. For Locke, the rights created through appropriations of unowned objects 
in the state of nature are subject to the condition that these objects are not let go to waste: 
 
he that so employed his Pains about any of the spontaneous Products of Nature, as any way to alter 
them, from the state which Nature put them in, by placing any of his Labour on them, did thereby 
acquire a Propriety in them: But if they perished, in his Possession, without their due use; if the Fruits 
rotted, or the Venison putrified, before he could spend it, he offended against the common Law of 
Nature, and was liable to be punished; he invaded his Neighbour‟s share, for he had no Right, farther 
than his Use called for any of them, and they might serve to afford him Conveniencies of Life.
33 
 
Locke writes immediately after: 
 
The same measures governed the Possession of Land too: Whatsoever he tilled and reaped, laid up and 
made use of, before it spoiled, that was his peculiar Right; whatsoever he enclosed and could feed, and 
make use of, the cattle and Product was also his. But if either the Grass of his Inclosure rotted on the 
ground, or the Fruit of his planting perished without gathering, and laying up, this part of the Earth, 
notwithstanding his Inclosure, was still to be looked on as Waste, and might be the Possession of any 
other.
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Again, such remarks seem a rather natural extension of the view here attributed to Locke. To labour on an 
unowned object is to do with it what is desirable and what should be done to it. For the productive use of natural 
resources is both beneficial in general and consistent with the will of God. Productive use of an unowned object 
is the rationale behind the justification of property rights. But if an act of original appropriation were to lead to a 
situation in which property rights bring about the waste of an object, the very grounds of those rights would be 
perverted. Thus we are not confronted with an uneasy situation in which we need to explain how spoliation may 
void an otherwise fine act of appropriation. For it avoids the conclusion that, since labour mixing may of itself 
provide me with a title to an object, we are here facing a conflict between what is consistent with the will of 
God and an individual‟s rights. Surely, such an outcome would have been alien to Locke‟s mind. Therefore, on 
this interpretation the Spoliation Proviso is very much part of Locke‟s wider theory of property rights. 
 
There is another passage that is often thought to sit oddly with Locke‟s views that the proposed interpretation 
can explain. This concerns Locke‟s remarks that certain acts can constitute original appropriation even though 
they seem to not involve any real value adding through labour at all. He writes: 
 
He that is nourished by the Acorns he picked up under an Oak, or the Apples he gathered from the Trees 
in the Wood, has certainly appropriated them to himself ... When did they begin to be his? When he 
digested? Or when he eat? Or when he boiled? Or when he brought them home? Or when he pickt them 
up? And ‟tis plain, if the first gathering made them not his, nothing else could.
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It is often argued that this passage constitutes the reductio of Locke‟s theory of labour mixing as appropriation. 
Surely the mere picking up of an acorn cannot be thought to constitute already such a labour mixing, or a 
significant enough instance of it. But again, on the present interpretation the passage makes perfect sense. 
Labour mixing merely functions as a means of individuating property rights (and is connected to the general 
spirit of property rights), thus it is perfectly possible for Locke to hold that even simply picking up an acorn 
may do the job. For Locke, picking up an acorn counts as original appropriation.
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5. Conclusion 
I have said that the standard criticisms of the idea of acts of appropriation fail to establish that there can be no 
acts that have the moral consequence of establishing a person‟s having a property right over a previously 
unowned object. The reason is that such criticisms mistakenly expect the account of original appropriation to 
perform the justificatory task of a theory of property rights. Instead, this justification should take place at the 
level of justifying an ongoing practice of people being permitted to claim such rights against each other. Against 
this background we can specify which acts will count as original appropriation. Thus, our account of acts of 
original appropriation does not have to carry the justificatory weight of a theory of property rights. Moreover, 
what counts as appropriation will not just be a matter of mere convention. A „natural‟ act of original 
appropriation, as I have called it, is an act by which a person begins to satisfy the general conditions for justified 
property rights. Finally, I put forward an illustration of this view by offering an interpretation of Locke‟s 
thoughts on property rights. 
 
Conceiving of original appropriation in the manner here defended has many advantages. For example, it leaves 
ample room for plausible limitations to our property rights when these limitations are themselves derived from a 
theory‟s rationale. We saw the benefits of this in the possibility of interpreting Locke‟s provisos as integral parts 
of his wider theory of property rights. 
 
Another important advantage of this view is that it allows for some necessary flexibility in our account of 
original appropriation. For example, it should no longer come as a surprise that acts of appropriation can only 
bring about property rights with regard to unowned objects, as this will be among the conditions set by the 
general theory for acts to have that significance. Moreover, it leaves room for the possibility of acts of 
appropriation of new forms of property, such as intellectual property, and for new forms of appropriation, such 
as „telepossession‟, a term coined by a court of law when it allowed the establishment of rights in a sunken 
treasure through the use of remote video cameras, instead of by physical possession.
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With this account of original appropriation in place, it is easy to see why the popular conclusion that theories of 
historical entitlement are discredited does not follow from the criticisms of the idea of acts of original 
appropriation. For the correct general justification of property rights may well be one that tells us that our 
practice should be one that follows the dictates of a theory of historical entitlement. Under such a theory, the 
rights people have with respect to objects will depend on the past legitimate exercise of individuals‟ powers to 
transfer their property rights over objects to others. In addition, the wider theory may also specify certain 
„natural‟ acts of original appropriation, such as the productive use of resources involved in labouring on an 
object. Here we have a textbook case of a theory of historical entitlement with attached to it a specific notion of 
what counts as original appropriation. 
 
I have not said much in defence of such a historical entitlement theory in this article. I take it that the defender 
of such a view will point to the productively beneficial effects for all of decentralizing the decisions on how to 
allocate resources. Similarly, a defender of the historical entitlement theory will argue that the best practice of 
property rights is one that includes the respecting of acts of original appropriation. Here the historical 
entitlement theorist can take comfort in the fact that allowing individuals the possibility unilaterally to 
appropriate unowned things is itself, under relevant circumstances, economically efficient.
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 As such, individual 
unilateral original appropriative acts are a natural part of a historical entitlement theory. 
 
One thing the critics of the idea of acts of appropriation are right about is that the fact that a person is able to 
appropriate things cannot itself serve as a justification for the existence of property rights. Indeed, that would be 
to get things the wrong way around. The right view, I have argued, is that, since persons can be justified in 
having property rights, they must be able to appropriate. But the fact that a theory of justified property holdings 
is theoretically prior to an account of justified acts of original appropriation does not warrant the conclusion that 
past acts of appropriation have no relevance today. 
 
There may, of course, be good reasons for abandoning theories of historical entitlement. But such a conclusion 
should follow from what turns out to be the true general justification of property rights. It cannot be thought to 
follow from the insight that there are no intrinsic acts of appropriation. Moreover, it is perfectly possible that a 
historical entitlement theory of property rights has a place within a wider theory of justice. But one thing that 
will not do is to assert, with Waldron, that the standard critiques of acts of original appropriation show that 
legitimate property rights must be subject to a straightforwardly distributional theory. 
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